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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE IMPACT OF DISABILITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO
MEDICAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCIES

KATIE HANSCHKE,* LESLIE E. WOLF** & WENDY F. HENSEL***
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a matter of time before the next widespread pandemic or natural
disaster hits the U.S.1 The Ebola epidemic in Africa has captured the public’s
attention and fanned fears of contagion as infected patients are flown to
America and placed in U.S. hospitals for treatment.2 The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention’s (CDC) mishandling of dangerous pathogens in its
labs and the infection of two nurses working with an Ebola patient in a Dallas
hospital have both highlighted the ongoing risk of infectious disease in the
U.S. and diminished confidence in the government’s ability to protect the
public from such threats.3 At the same time, news reports continue to track

* Law Library Fellow at the University of Arizona.
** Director of the Center for Law, Health & Society and Professor of Law at Georgia State.
*** Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Professor of Law at Georgia
University College of Law
1. As the World Health Organization itself has concluded, “[i]nfluenza pandemics will
continue to occur,” and there is no way to predict “exactly when, where, and how severe the next
pandemic will be.” WORLD HEALTH ORG., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH
REGULATIONS (2005): REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005) IN RELATING TO PANDEMIC (H1N1) 2009, at 10
(2011) [hereinafter WHO REPORT]. See also Joseph Bresee & Frederick G. Hayden, Epidemic
Influenza – Responding to the Expected by Unpredictable, 368 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 589, 592
(2013).
2. See Adam Nossiter, Fears of Ebola Breeds a Terror of Physicians, N.Y. TIMES (July 27,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/world/africa/ebola-epidemic-west-africa-guinea.
html; see also Adam Nossiter & Alan Cowell, Sierra Leone Declares Public Health Emergency
over Ebola Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2014); see also Adam Nossiter & Alan Cowell, Ebola
Virus is Outpacing Efforts to Control It, World Health Body Warns, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/world/africa/african-leaders-and-who-intensify-effort-tocombat-ebola-virus.html. See generally Misty Williams & Ariel Hart, Ebola Patients Stir Worry
in Atlanta, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 2, 2014, at A1.
3. Donald G. McNeil, C.D.C. Closes Anthrax and Flu Labs After Accidents, N.Y. TIMES
(July 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/12/science/cdc-closes-anthrax-and-flu-labsafter-accidents.html; Denise Grady, Pathogen Mishaps Rise as Regulators Stay Clear, N.Y.
259
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instances of people contracting and dying from avian influenza in Asia,4 and
concerns remain that the Middle East Respiratory Virus (MERS), first
identified in 2012,5 will spread beyond the Arabian Peninsula.6 All of this is
coupled with the significant rise in the last decade of earthquakes, hurricanes,
and other natural disasters that have widespread catastrophic consequences for
the populations involved.
Despite the certainty of similar future events, the World Health
Organization (WHO) has acknowledged that “[t]he world is ill-prepared to
respond to . . . any similarly global, sustained and threatening public-health
emergency.”7 The international response to the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus
stands as a cautionary tale in this regard. Although the pandemic fortunately
proved to be less severe than initially anticipated, it nevertheless resulted in
shortages of medical equipment, overburdened hospitals, and preventable
patient deaths, particularly among young people.8 The “fundamental gap
between global need and global capacity” in health care has led to “the
unavoidable reality . . . that tens of millions of people w[ill] be at risk of
dying” once a severe pandemic hits.9

TIMES (July 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/20/science/pathogen-mishaps-rise-aslabs-proliferate-with-scant-regulation.html.
4. See, e.g., Faine Greenwood, Cambodia Bird Flu Outbreak Continues with 14th Case,
GLOBAL POST (July 16, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/
cambodia/130716/cambodia-bird-flu-outbreak-continues-14th-case; see also Donald G. McNeil
Jr., New Tools to Hunt Viruses, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/
28/health/new-tools-to-hunt-new-viruses.html?pagewanted=all (describing the 36 deaths from
H7N9 in China and 22 deaths from a virus related to SARS in the Arabian Peninsula). See also
Avian Influenza A Virus Infections in Humans, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/avian-in-humans.htm (last updated Jan. 8, 2014).
5. Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/mers/ (last updated Jan. 26, 2014).
6. Donald G. McNeil Jr., MERS Virus Not Global Emergency, Health Officials Say, N.Y.
TIMES (July 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/health/mers-virus-not-global-emer
gency-health-officials-say.html; Donald G. McNeil Jr., Second U.S. Case of. MERS Virus is
Confirmed, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/health/second-case
-of-mers-virus-is-announced.html; Ben Hubbard & Donald G. McNeil Jr., Flawed Saudi
Response is Cited in the Outbreak of the Middle East Virus, MERS, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/world/middleeast/flawed-saudi-response-fueled-outbreak-of
-mers-middle-east-virus.html?_r=0; MERS is Unlikely to Spread in Asia: WHO Expert, YAHOO
HEALTH (July 10, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/mers-unlikely-spread-asia-expert-0726176
03.html.
7. WHO REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
8. Interim Guidance on Infection Control Measures for 2009 H1N1 Influenza in Healthcare
Settings, Including Protection of Healthcare Personnel, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/guidelines_infection_control.htm (last updated July
15, 2010); WHO REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
9. WHO REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
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The reality of scarcity will inevitably lead to difficult decisions about the
allocation of medical resources, such as who will have priority access to
ventilators and critical care beds when demand exceeds supply. In the U.S.,
there has been little guidance from the federal and state governments on how to
prioritize distribution between individuals, in part because these issues are
highly politicized and implicate the fundamental question of who will live and
die in the event of a public health emergency. “To fill this gap, some public
health and medical organizations have promulgated protocols” to guide
allocation decisions in some circumstances.10 “Although these efforts at
advance planning are to be lauded, they raise a number of troubling civil rights
issues,” particularly for people with disabilities.11 Several of the protocols
exclude some people with disabilities from receiving care altogether, even
when their disabilities do not affect the likely success of the medical
interventions at issue.12 Still others preclude some individuals with disabilities
from receiving care because of a need for prolonged use of resources, poor
“quality of life,” or limited long-term prognosis.13
Two of us previously evaluated the legality and ethics of these allocation
protocols, concluding many of their directives violated U.S. law and were
highly problematic in other respects.14 We found that even when purportedly
“objective” criteria are used to allocate care, subjective notions about the
desirability of life with disabilities can play a determinative role in allocation
decisions.15 Because there will be little or no time in a public health emergency
for thoughtful reflection on these fundamental questions, we argued that “[i]t is
critical to evaluate in advance the legal [and ethical] parameters within which
medical professionals and public health officials must operate when setting
treatment agendas,” and involve people with disabilities directly in these
discussions.16

10. Wendy F. Hensel & Leslie E. Wolf, Playing God: The Legality of Plans Restricting
People with Disabilities from Scarce Resources in Public Health Emergencies, 63 FLA. L. REV.
719, 719 (2011) [hereinafter Playing God].
11. Id.
12. Id.; see also Leslie E Wolf & Wendy F. Hensel, Valuing Lives: Allocating Scarce
Medical Resources During a Public Health Emergency and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(Perspective), PLOS CURRENTS: DISASTERS, 2011, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Valuing Lives].
13. Playing God, supra note 10, at 719.
14. See Valuing Lives, supra note 12.
15. Playing God, supra note 10, at 752.
16. Id. at 723-724, 769-770. Our analysis focused on the allocation of critical care medicine
during a public health emergency. Although the issue of whether excluding people with
disabilities from access to critical care medicine during a public health emergency has not been
litigated, two courts have considered the application of antidiscrimination laws to emergency
plans. See, e.g., Cmtys. Actively Living Indep. & Free v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 09-0287
CBM, 20ll WL 4595993 (C.D. Ca. Feb. 10, 2011) and Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of the
Disabled v. Bloomberg, 980 F. Supp. 2d 588 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2013). Both involved plans for
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To date, few, if any, U.S. scholars engaged in this debate have drawn on
the myriad approaches taken by the international community when facing these
same issues. Because the legal and social status of people with disabilities is
tied to underlying societal attitudes toward impairments,17 cultural differences
between populations may lead to significantly different distributive outcomes.
Examining other countries’ approaches to the allocation problem in public
health emergencies is important not only its own right, but also because we
may gain insight into how to develop more equitable policies to guide
allocation decisions during a public health emergency in the U.S.
Part II of this paper details the methodology we employed in selecting
countries for discussion herein and the materials that we reviewed. Part III
briefly discusses the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (Convention), which many international governments have ratified
and thus, overlays much of the international discussion on treatment protocols.
Part IV then systematically explores the antidiscrimination protection found in

responding to physical emergencies (e.g., after a hurricane, earthquake, flooding, terrorist attack,
etc.), including evacuation, shelter, and related plans. In both cases, there was evidence that the
cities involved had failed to take into account the special needs of people with disabilities and
concluded that, as a result, the emergency plans violated federal antidiscrimination laws. The
California U.S. District Court concluded that “[b]ecause individuals with disabilities requires
special needs, the City disproportionately burdens them through its facially neutral practice of
administering its program in a manner that fails to address such needs.” Cmtys. Actively Living
Indep. & Free, 2011 WL 4595993, at *14. The Court disputed the City’s claim that it could make
reasonable accommodations as needed during an emergency, noting:
[t]he purpose of the City’s emergency preparedness program is to anticipate the needs of
its resident in the event of an emergency and to minimize the very type of last-minute
individualized requests for assistance described by the City, particularly when the City’s
infrastructure is substantially compromised or strained by an imminent or ongoing
emergency or disaster.
Id. The New York U.S. District Court similarly found that the City’s plans violated federal and
state antidiscrimination laws in a number of ways, although not in all the ways that the plaintiffs
alleged. Brooklyn Ctr. For Independence, 980 F. Supp. 2d at 658-59. Importantly, the Court
noted:
[t]he question in this case, however, is not whether the City, or individual first responders,
have done an admirable job in planning for, or responding to, disasters generally. They
plainly have. Instead, the question is whether the City has done enough to provide people
with disabilities meaningful access to its emergency preparedness program given the
broad remedial purposes of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the [state
antidiscrimination law].
Id. at 659. Similarly, in the context of allocation protocols for critical care, we have applauded the
efforts of those who have developed those protocols and have suggested that more may need to be
done to ensure people with disabilities are provided meaningful access to critical care during an
emergency.
17. Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life Activity Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act? 2002 WISC. L. REV. 1140, 1145 (2002) (describing the social model of
disability).
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each country and the existing emergency protocols in effect during a potential
epidemic. Part V concludes with an analysis of the public policy implications
of these disparate approaches and the feasibility and desirability of adopting
them within the U.S.
II. METHODOLOGY
The following analysis explores the approaches taken in Mexico, Brazil,
South Africa, Singapore, Cambodia, Australia, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom (U.K.). We purposefully selected a diverse group of countries in
terms of geography, culture, economic status, and governmental structure.18
Some we included because of their proximity to prior or existing pandemics,19
and others we included in an attempt to reflect divergent cultures across
continents. We also necessarily took into account pragmatic considerations,
such as the availability of materials in an accessible language.20
Conducting international research presents unique challenges. Our efforts
were informed by a variety of resources, including Foreign Law Guide and
Globalex, which outline the various concerns associated with conducting
research within each foreign jurisdiction. We relied on World Constitutions
Illustrated for locating countries’ constitutions, as it is considered reliable,
particularly for constitutions in translation. We also relied on government
websites for legislation, regulations, and guidance documents. Because the
documents are provided through government websites that change often and do
not necessarily provide information on said changes, many of the web sources
provided for said documents required archived versions of the government
websites. This is to assure access to the exact language used to interpret each
country’s guidance.

18. Our selection was also informed by preliminary research conducted to understand the
local context as we presented our previous paper, Playing God, at international conferences,
including conferences in the United Kingdom, Tel Aviv, and New Zealand.
19. For example, we included Mexico given its involvement in the 2009 H1N1 influenza
pandemic, and Oceania both for its proximity to Asia (where avian flu has been prevalent) and its
similar common law tradition to the United States.
20. Both Mexico’s and Brazil’s disability discrimination prevention legislation were only
available in the countries’ native tongues, Spanish and Portuguese respectively. However, by
reviewing an unofficial translation, one can still develop a sense of the protections in place and
what each of the countries value regarding prevention of disability discrimination. We used
Google Translate™ to facilitate translation of these materials, with one of us (LEW) reviewing
the original material as a check (albeit limited) on the translation.
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III. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
Unlike the U.S.,21 many countries have signed or ratified the Convention, a
treaty that may have significant implications for the treatment of individuals
with disabilities in public health emergencies going forward. The Convention
recognizes the equality of all persons under the law and prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability,22 defined as “any distinction,
exclusion or restriction . . . which has the purpose or effect of impairing or
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with
others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms[.]”23 The Convention
also requires “reasonable accommodation” to allow people with disabilities to
participate fully in public life.24
The Convention specifically requires states to take “all necessary measures
to ensure the protection and safety of people with disabilities in situations of
risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and the
occurrence of natural disasters.”25 Signatories must “prevent discriminatory
denial of health care or health services or food and fluids on the basis of
disability.”26 Finally, the Convention assures the right to life, including
requiring a country to “take all necessary measures to ensure its effective
enjoyment by persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others.”27
The language of the Convention may provide significant protection for
people with disabilities during public health emergencies. Its preclusion of
disability as a factor in withholding health care arguably would extend to
situations of scarcity, mandating that individuals with disabilities receive

21. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNITED STATES RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES 14 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/
Treaty%20Ratification%20Advocacy%20document%20-%20final%20-%20Aug%202009.pdf.
22. See generally Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006,
2515 U.S.T. No. 44910-44917 [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention was adopted on
December 13, 2006 and opened for signature on March 30, 2007. U.N. Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, DEPT. OF PUBLIC INFO., UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/disa
bilities/convention/signature.shtml (last accessed Feb. 28, 2015).
23. Convention, supra note 22, art. 1, 2.
24. A “reasonable accommodation” is defined as any “necessary or appropriate modification
and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular
case to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with other
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Convention, supra note 22, art. 2.
25. Convention, supra note 22, art. 11. As this section describes, this responsibility is “in
accordance with [the state’s] obligations under international law, including international
humanitarian law and international human rights law.” Id.
26. Convention, supra note 22, art. 25. The U.N. Convention also requires that signatories
“provide persons with disabilities with the same range, quality and standard of free or affordable
health care and programmes as provided to other persons, including in the area of sexual and
reproductive health and population-based public health programmes.” Id.
27. Convention, supra note 22, art. 10.
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comparable treatment to those who are not disabled. The extent of protection,
however, depends on the degree and manner to which it is implemented in
individual countries.28 Accordingly, the specific impact of the Convention in
each country is discussed, where applicable, in Part IV below.
IV. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF DISABILITY AND ACCESS TO HEALTH
CARE
In light of the high stakes involved in public health emergencies, it is no
surprise that each of the countries identified has outlined at least basic
principals and protocols to guide government decision-making in such
circumstances.29 However, the degree to which these protocols specifically
contemplate and protect people with disabilities from discrimination varies
considerably.
A.

Mexico
1. General Protection for People with Disabilities

Mexico gives broad legal protection to its citizens with disabilities. It was
an early supporter of the Convention and one of the first to ratify its

28. As described in the individual country sections below, the process and the importance of
ratification varies from country to country. See infra Part IV.
29. International organizations, like the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World
Bank have facilitated countries efforts to adopt plans to address public health emergencies. See
Influenza Pandemic Preparedness, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/influenza/prepar
edness/pandemic/en/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). As stated on the WHO website and in many of
the documents available there, “Influenza pandemics are unpredictable but recurring events that
can cause severe social, economic, and political stress. Advanced planning and preparedness are
critical in helping to mitigate the impact of influenza epidemic or pandemics.” Id. The WHO has
developed a framework, checklist, and guidance for influenza pandemic preparedness planning.
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK (2011)
[framework]; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO CHECKLIST FOR INFLUENZA PANDEMIC
PREPAREDNESS PLANNING (2005 [checklist]; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE (2009) [guidance]. While considered in its other
work, WHO has also specifically focused on preparedness planning for low-resource countries.
See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., INFORMAL CONSULTATION ON INFLUENZA PANDEMIC
PREPAREDNESS IN COUNTRIES WITH LIMITED RESOURCES (2004). The World Bank has
partnered with WHO’s efforts to support countries preparedness efforts, particularly with respect
to capacity building. Pandemics Overview, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/
pandemics/overview (last updated Sept. 30, 2014). In addition to providing financial support, the
World Bank has engaged in information sharing. Id. At least two of the countries we studied here
(Mexico and Cambodia) benefited from assistance. See Mexico—All Projects, THE WORLD BANK
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mexico/projects/all?qterm=pandemic&lang_exact=English
(last visited Feb. 6, 2015); Cambodia—All Projects, THE WORLD BANK http://www.worldbank.
org/en/country/cambodia/projects/all?qterm=pandemic&lang_exact=English (last visited Feb. 6,
2015).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

266

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 8:259

provisions.30 Its own Constitution provides that all citizens have the right to
health care31 and specifically precludes “discrimination motivated by . . .
disabilities . . . conditions of health . . . or any other [basis] that infringes
human dignity . . . or . . . diminish[es] the rights and freedoms of persons[.]”32
It further mandates that the norms of human rights for its citizens be
interpreted “at all times” to favor individuals with “the greatest possible
protection.”33
Mexico reiterated these principals in its passage of the groundbreaking
General Law for the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities (GLIPD) in 2011.
GLIPD mandates the full inclusion of people with disabilities inside “a
framework of respect, equality and equal opportunities”34 and broadly covers
all individuals with impairments that pose barriers to the equal inclusion in
society. Article Three of the GLIPD explicitly states the law is applicable to
various federal, state, and municipal government entities, as well as private
entities that provide services to people with disabilities.35 The Law authorizes
affirmative “antidiscrimination” measures.36 Article Seven provides that the
Ministry of Health is responsible for assuring the highest attainable standard of
health for persons with disabilities.37 This will be done through programs and
services that were provided and designed based on quality, expertise, gender,
and free or affordable price.38
Mexico’s General Health Law articulates the various aspects of the right of
all citizens to health services as provided by the Mexican Constitution39 and
specifically recognizes the importance of providing care to vulnerable groups

30. Mexico signed on as soon as the Convention was open for signature and ratified it (and
the optional protocol) on December 17, 2007. Convention and Optional Protocol Signatures and
Ratifications, UN ENABLE, http://www.un.org/disabilities/countries.asp?navid=17&pid=166, (last
accessed January 5, 2015) [hereinafter U.N. Convention Signatures].
31. Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, as amended, art. 4, Diario Oficial de
la Federación [DO], February 5, 1917. (Mex.).
32. Id. art. 1.
33. Id.
34. General Law for the Inclusion of People with Disabilities, art. 1, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [D.O.], May 30, 2011 (Mex.). [hereinafter Mexico Disability Act].
35. Id. art. 3.
36. “Anti-discrimination measures include the prohibition of conduct that target or
consequence violating the dignity of a person, create an intimidating, hostile, degrading or
offensive environment due to the disability that it possesses.” Id.
37. Id. art. 7.
38. Id.
39. General Health Law, art. 6, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], February 7, 1984
(Mex.).
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in society.40 Mexico provides universal access to health care through the
System of Social Protection in Health.41
2. Specific Protection Relating to Pandemics
Mexico’s General Civil Protection Act outlines several important
parameters for the Mexican government in the case of a natural disaster or
emergency, which includes pandemics.42 The principles meant to guide
government actions43 during such a pandemic center around “protection of life,
health and integrity,” “fairness . . . in the delivery of aid and . . . in an
emergency or disaster,” and “respect for human rights.”44 Throughout the risk
management process, the Act requires both that priority be given to vulnerable
social groups45 and that, when implementing this law, government entities
comply with the Constitution.46 Thus, the Act explicitly reinforces the
continued effect of constitutional protections against discrimination based on
disability.47
Mexico’s National Preparedness Plan and Response to an Influenza
Pandemic (Preparedness Plan and Response)48 more specifically addresses the
40. See id. art. 3.
41. Id. art. 77. See also Felicia Marie Knaul et al., The Question for Universal Health
Coverage: Achieving Social Protection for All in Mexico, 380 LANCET 1259, 1259 (2012).
42. General Law of Civil Protection, as amended, art. 2, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DO], June 6, 2012 (Mex.).
43. “The private and social sectors will participate in the achievement of the objectives of
this law, in the terms and conditions that it sets.” Id. art. 1. Further, in order to receive support
from the central government, state governments must demonstrate that they have complied with
the principles of impartiality. Id. art. 18.
44. Id. art. 5.
45. Id. art. 21. The Constitution identifies the following factors as potentially creating social
vulnerability: ethnic or national origin, gender, age, disabilities, social status, conditions of health,
religion, opinions, preferences, and civil estate. Political Constitution of the United Mexican
States, as amended, art. 1, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], February 5, 1917. (Mex.).
46. Mexico General Civil Protection Act art. 6.
47. See Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DO], February 5, 1917. (Mex.).
48. One of these is the chapter on medical care and hospitals, in which Mexico has outlined
a method of triage meant to evaluate the needs of citizens based on different medical conditions,
consistent with the World Health Organization guidelines. SECRETARÍA DE SALUD, PLAN
NACIONAL DE PREPARACIÓN Y RESPUESTA ANTE UNA PANDEMIA DE INFLUENZA [NATIONAL
PREPAREDNESS PLAN AND RESPONSE TO AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC], ch. 5, 3-5 (2006)
[hereinafter INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS PLAN]. This plan generally addresses how to expand and
coordinate assessment of flu cases and what care (e.g., inpatient vs. outpatient care; prevention
measures vs. antiretrovirals), as well as priorities for vaccination. See id. ch. 5. However, the
priority setting for vaccination is typically quite different than for critical care. As is common,
Mexico preferences health care workers and certain government officials (necessary for function
during the emergency) and patients at risk of complications from illness. Id. at 27-28. In contrast,
when priorities are specified for critical care medicine, sicker patients are often excluded. Playing
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application of the Constitution of Mexico, the Law of General Civil Protection,
and the General Health Law during a pandemic.49 It reiterates the principles of
respect for the dignity of the human being and non-infringement of
fundamental rights,50 but does not specifically address the allocation of critical
care.51 Although the Preparedness Plan and Response acknowledges that
during a state of emergency, fundamental rights, including health, may be
diminished temporarily,52 citizens who believe they have had their rights
infringed are permitted to file a complaint with the National Human Rights
Commission for investigation.53 Taken together, these measures suggest that
exclusion of persons with disabilities from care could potentially be punishable
under Mexican law.54 Moreover, this position is consistent with the Mexican
constitutional provisions on public health emergencies. While the President
may, with agreement of various government officials, restrict or suspend “the
rights and guarantees which could be an obstacle to [a] rapid and effective
response to the situation,”55 such restrictions may last only a short period of
time56 and may not limit “the exercise of the rights to non-discrimination and
[the right] to life.”57
Overall, Mexico has a consistent, comprehensive approach to the
protection of people with disabilities and equal access to health care. Mexico
embraces the principles of equal protection and antidiscrimination in its
constitutional provisions58 and ratification of the Convention. It translates these
principles into specific rights through its GLIPD and its guarantee of universal
health care.59 In its General Civil Protection Act, Mexico is explicit that those
civil rights remain in effect in a public health emergency.60 Entities not only
are prohibited from discriminating against vulnerable populations in the
distribution of care, but also, arguably must give priority to these individuals in

God, supra note 10, at 728. The protocol does not address allocation of critical care medicine,
such as respirators, during a pandemic.
49. INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS PLAN, supra note 48, ch. 10, 5-8.
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id. at 7.
53. Id.
54. Of course, this right may be illusory should critical care medicine be inappropriately
withheld during a public health emergency.
55. Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, art. 29, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DO], February 5, 1917. (Mex.).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id. arts. 1, 4.
59. See General Health Law, arts. 3, 77, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], February 7,
1984 (Mex.).
60. See General Law of Civil Protection, arts. 1, 5, 18, 21, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DO], June 6, 2012 (Mex.).
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times of crisis. Nevertheless, it acknowledges in its Preparedness Plan and
Response that fundamental rights might be diminished in a state of
emergency.61 While it provides a mechanism for redressing any such
infringement, in the case of critical care resources during a public health
emergency, such redress may come too late.
B.

Brazil
1. General Protection for People with Disabilities

Brazil has afforded significant protection to people with disabilities. The
country not only has adopted the Convention and its optional protocol,62 but it
has specifically recognized that these protections rise to the level of
constitutional rights.63 Notably, this is the only treaty to garner such distinction
from the Brazilian government.64
Brazil’s Constitution specifically provides that “everyone is equal before
the law”65 and states that one of the fundamental objectives of the Federative
Republic of Brazil is “to promote the well-being of all, without prejudice as to
origin, race, sex, color, age and any other forms of discrimination.”66 Although
protection of disability is not specifically articulated in this list, the
Constitution states that health is a social right and provides robust protection
for individuals’ access to health care.67 It articulates that this is “the duty of the
National Government and shall be guaranteed by social and economic policies
aimed at reducing the risk of illness and other maladies and by universal and
equal access to all activities and services for its promotion, protection and
recovery.”68 The Constitution goes further to enforce this provision by
providing in Article Eighty-Five that acts by the President of Brazil against the
exercise of a social right, which includes access to health care, is an
impeachable offense.69
Brazil70 also has legislation outlining the governmental protections for
individuals with disabilities and access to health care.71 Article Two of Law

61. See INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS PLAN, supra note 48, chs. 5, 10.
62. See U.N. Convention Signatures, supra note 30.
63. Decreto no. 6.949, de 3 de Agosto de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO
[D.O.E.R.J.] (Braz.).
64. Id.
65. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 3 (Braz.).
66. Id. art. 3.
67. Id. art. 6.
68. Id. art. 196.
69. Id. art. 85.
70. According to Foreign Law Guide, a new civil code was enacted beginning in 2002. The
current civil code consolidated all aspects of corporate law and governance. Current legislation in
Brazil is extremely difficult to follow. National legislation is generally accomplished now
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No. 7853 ensures that individuals with disabilities have access to public and
private health establishments72 and requires adequate treatment based on
“appropriate” standards,73 although it does not define either “adequate” or
“appropriate.” Additionally under the Law, refusing, delaying, or hindering
admission for medical or hospital care “where possible” is a crime, punishable
by incarceration for one to four years and includes a fine.74 However, the Law
fails to specify what the qualifier “where possible” means.75 Thus, it is not
clear under what circumstances, if any, care for a person with disabilities may
be refused, delayed, or hindered. The accompanying regulations define
disability as any loss of psychological, physiological or anatomical structure or
function, causing the inability to perform activities within the standard
considered normal for humans.76 The regulations also include a section focused
on equalization of opportunities for people with disabilities, which specifically
provides for services to support “comprehensive rehabilitation.”77 In addition,
the regulations describe a comprehensive list of health services necessary both
to prevent disability and to support those with disabilities.78 This includes “the
development of health programs for the disabled, developed with the
participation of society . . . [motivating] social inclusion.”79 Ordinance No.
793, moreover, establishes a Network of Care of People with Disabilities,”80
which is tasked with ensuring access to care and quality of services for this
group.81
Brazil’s Law No. 8080 of September 1990 also governs its Unified Health
System. This law regulates both private and public legal entities and

through separate administrative organs. Foreign Law Guide recommends looking to
commercially published guides on legislation in Brazil, so the research utilized below will offer
more of a guide in the right direction rather than a completely reliable source of what laws are in
effect. See generally MARCI HOFFMAN, FOREIGN LAW GUIDE, BRAZIL –LEGISLATION AND THE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2013), available at http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/foreign-lawguide/brazil-legislation-and-the-judicial-system-COM_037302.
71. Lei No. 7.853, de 24 de Outubro de 1989, art. 2, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
25.10.89 (Braz.).
72. Id. art. 2(II)(d).
73. Id.
74. Id. art. 8.
75. Id.
76. Decreto No. 3.298, de 20 de Dezembro de 1999, art .(3)(I), DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 21.11.1999 (Braz.).
77. Id. art. 15.
78. Id. art. 16-23.
79. Id. art. 16(VI).
80. Portaria No. 793, de 24 de Abril de 2012, art. 1, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] (Braz.) [hereinafter Ordinance No. 793].
81. Id. art. 2(IV).
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individuals.82 The Law both establishes health as a fundamental right, in which
the State must create an environment conducive to its full realization,83 and it
requires that the State establish conditions to ensure equal access to actions and
services meant to promote, protect, and aid in recovery.84 Further, the
principles meant to guide the Unified Health System center around universal
access to care, equality of health care, the absence of prejudice, and use of
epidemiology for establishing priorities, allocating resources, and program
orientation.85 While this Law discusses coordination by the Unified Health
System to assure goods and services are provided during an outbreak of
epidemic,86 it does not specify how these resources will be allocated during an
epidemic.
2. Specific Protection Relating to Pandemics
Brazil offers several Agency documents to guide the government in an
epidemic,87 including a Protocol for Combating Influenza Pandemic (2009):
Shares of Primary Health Care88 and the Contingency Plan to Confront an
Influenza Pandemic,89 which is in draft form. Although these documents
provide some insight into Brazil’s approaches to allocation during a pandemic,
they focus on prevention and treatment with vaccinations and antivirals rather
than allocation of critical care medicine during a public health emergency.90
Although both documents preference vulnerable populations for vaccination
and treatment, application to distribution questions involving critical care

82. Lei No. 8080, de 19 de Setembro de 1990, art. 4, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
20.9.1990 (Braz.).
83. Id. art. 2.
84. Id.
85. Id. art. 7.
86. Id. art. 15(XIII).
87. Brazil provides a Vaccination Manual that outlines how vaccinations should be
distributed; however, the manual does not have to be strictly abided by during the course of an
epidemic. See MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE, MANUAL DE NORMAS DE VACINAÇÃO [MANUAL
STANDARDS VACCINATION] 17 (3rd ed. 2001) [hereinafter VACCINATION MANUAL].
88. MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE, PROTOCOLO PARA O ENFRENTEMENTO À PENDEMIA DE
INFLUENZA PANDÊMICA (H1N1) 2009: AÇÕES DA ATENÇÃO PRIMÁRIA À SAÚDE [PROTOCOL
FOR FACING THE PANDEMIC OF INFLUENZA PANDEMIC (H1N1) 2009: THE ACTIONS PRIMARY
HEALTH CARE] 1-3 (1st ed. 2010) [hereinafter INFLUENZA PANDEMIC PROTOCOL].
89. HEALTH MINISTRY, BRAZIL CONTINGENCY PLAN TO CONFRONT AN INFLUENZA
PANDEMIC 1 (2005). Much of the document is still in development; however, it does offer
preliminary insight into the Brazilian government decision-making involving allocation of
resources during such an event. Id. at 10-11.
90. See generally id. (focusing on prevention & treatment with vaccinations and antivirals);
see also INFLUENZA PANDEMIC PROTOCOL, supra note 88.
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medicine is limited.91 Moreover, it is not clear whether these have any binding
effect.
Taken together, Brazil’s constitutional provisions92 and legislation93
demonstrate a strong commitment to equity in treatment. While disability is
not explicitly identified as a target of protection in the Constitution, Brazil has
recognized the rights afforded under the Convention as constitutional rights.94
Moreover, it has adopted legislation designed to provide equitable access to
health care for people with disabilities. Nevertheless, the provisions suggesting
that these protections may be lifted in undefined circumstances95 render it
unclear how these rights would be applied with respect to people with
disabilities in allocating care in times of emergency.
C. South Africa
1. General Protection for People with Disabilities
South Africa has a number of constitutional provisions and legislative acts
that protect the rights of people with disabilities. Additionally, the country has
both signed and ratified the Convention.96 South Africa’s Constitution,
moreover, provides both that all citizens are “equally entitled to the rights,
privileges and benefits of citizenship” and that “[e]veryone has inherent
dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.”97 It states
that “[e]quality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and
freedoms,”98 and specifically provides that “the state may not unfairly
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds,
including . . . disability.”99

91. As we have discussed elsewhere, the allocation of vaccines may be guided by different
allocation principles than for critical care. For example, health care personnel may be prioritized
for vaccination because they provide essential services when responding to an epidemic and
caring for patients. On the other hand, a person requiring a ventilator is unlikely to recover
quickly enough to return to the workforce and assist with the public health emergency. Thus, the
same principles may not apply. Playing God, supra note 10, at 732-733.
92. See, e.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] arts. 3, 6, 85, 196 (Braz.).
93. See, e.g., Lei No. 7.853, de 24 de Outubro de 1989, arts. 2, 8 DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 25.10.89 (Braz.); see also Decreto No. 3.298, de 20 de Dezembro de 1999, arts. 3,
15, 16, 23, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 21.11.1999 (Braz.).
94. See Decreto No. 6.949, de 25 de Agosto de 2009, art. 28, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 25.8.2009 (Braz.) (providing Presidential declaration of Brazil’s adoption of the UN
Convention); see also Convention, supra note 22.
95. See Lei No. 7.853, de 24 de Outubro de 1989, art 8, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 25.10.89 (Braz.).
96. U.N. Convention Signatures, supra note 30.
97. S. Afr. Const., 1996, arts. 3(2)(a), 10.
98. Id. art. 9(2).
99. Id. art. 9(3).
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There are limits to this protection that may be significant in the context of
pandemics. First, not all discrimination is precluded; instead, only that which is
considered “unfair.”100 Of particular concern, the South African Constitution
lists rights that are non-derogable during declared “states of emergency,” such
as the right to life and the right to human dignity.101 Notably, discrimination
based on disability is not included in this list102 and thus presumably may be
set-aside during a “state of emergency”. Potentially, this could lead to a
complete nullification of all constitutional protections against disability
discrimination in the context of a public health emergency.
Nevertheless, the Constitution specifically grants the right to health care103
and requires that “the state . . . take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources” to achieve this mandate.104 Although this is
favorable to people with disabilities, the limitation to “available resources”
could, once again, potentially restrict access to health care in times of scarcity.
Notably, however, the next section provides that “[n]o one may be refused
emergency medical treatment”105 and arguably is not subject to the “available
resources” limitation.
The Policy on Quality in Health Care for South Africa (Policy on Quality),
moreover, provides a broader health care policy overview.106 Although not
focused on an epidemic-specific situation, this document provides insight into
South Africa’s commitments in its health care system.107 As in other
documents, it stresses the importance of equity in rendering health care to
vulnerable populations, where “equity means ensuring that the whole
population has access to quality health care.”108 Importantly for our purposes,
it addresses the need to focus on historically disadvantaged groups, including

100. Id. art. 9(5).
101. S. Afr. Const., 1996, art. 37(5)(c).
102. See id. The other grounds that are included as non-derogable rights against unfair
discrimination are race, color, ethnic or social origin, sex, religion or language. Id. art. 9(3).
103. Id. art. 27(1)(a).
104. Id. art. 27(2).
105. Id. art. 27(3).
106. See generally NAT’L DEPT. OF HEALTH, A POLICY ON QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE FOR
SOUTH AFRICA 2 (2007) [hereinafter POLICY ON QUALITY]. South Africa has also compiled a
Patient’s Rights Charter that, although not directly related to pandemics, does provide for the
right to “access to health care” and the right to have treatment uninterrupted. HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA, NATIONAL PATIENTS’ RIGHTS CHARTER 1.2, 2.11
(2008). However, this charter “is subject to any laws operating within the Republic of South
Africa” and “the financial means of the country.” Patients’ Rights Charter, NAT’L DEPT. OF
HEALTH (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov.za/VC/docs/policy/Patient%20Rights%20
Charter.pdf.
107. See POLICY ON QUALITY, supra note 106.
108. Id. at 10.
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people with disabilities.109 The Policy on Quality also provides specific
examples of what equity requires, including “[r]edistributing health
expenditure to achieve equity—those with equal need should receive the same
level of funding; [r]edistributing health resources, in particular doctors and
nurses; [s]etting national norms and standards to judge that all people receive
an acceptable quality of care; and [m]onitoring progress.”110 While the South
African Constitution may allow lifting of antidiscrimination protections for
people with disabilities during an emergency,111 these documents suggest a
stronger commitment to alleviating disparities in health care that may
nevertheless influence decision-making during a public health emergency.
South Africa’s Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act (Unfair Discrimination Act) also contains several
important provisions. The Act defines discrimination as “any act or omission,
including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation which directly or
indirectly—(a) imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantages on; or (b)
withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from, any person on one or
more of the prohibited grounds.”112 Such prohibited grounds include disability,
and the Act specifically bars “denying or removing from any person who has a
disability, any supporting or enabling facility necessary for their functioning in
society.”113
The Act explains the concept of “unfair discrimination,” evaluating context
based on a list of factors114 and whether the complained of behavior
“reasonably and justifiably differentiates between persons according to
objectively determinable criteria, intrinsic to the activity concerned.”115 The

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See S. Afr. Const., 1996, art. 37(5)(c).
112. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 §
1(1)(viii) (S. Afr.).
113. Id. § 9(a).
114. Id. § 14(3). The factors are:
[w]hether the discrimination impairs or is likely to impair human dignity; [ ]the impact or
likely impact of the discrimination on the complainant; [ ] the position of the complainant
in society and whether he or she suffers from patterns of disadvantage or belongs to a
group that suffers from such patterns of disadvantage; [ ] the nature and extent of the
discrimination; [ ] whether the discrimination is systemic in nature; [ ] whether the
discrimination has a legitimate purpose; [ ] whether and to what extent the discrimination
achieves its purpose; [ ] whether there are less restrictive and less disadvantageous means
to achieve the purpose; [and] [ ] whether [and] to what extent the respondent has taken
such steps as being reasonable in the circumstances to– [ ] address the disadvantage which
arises from or is related to one or more of the prohibited grounds; or [ ] accommodate
diversity.
Id.
115. Id. § 14(2)(c).
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favorable treatment of people with disabilities is permissible and not
considered “unfair discrimination.”116 The Act also imposes a positive duty on
public institutions to eliminate discrimination and promote equality.117
Of particular significance, South Africa’s Unfair Discrimination Act
specifically identifies unfair practices in the provision of health care services,
and states that a person cannot be “unfairly den[ied] or refus[ed] . . . access to
health care facilities.”118 Moreover, emergency medical treatment cannot be
denied “to persons or particular groups identified by one or more of the
prohibited grounds,”119 including disability.120 As discussed earlier, however,
such protection is not absolute and may be reduced during a state of emergency
such that it does not apply during public health emergencies.121
South Africa’s National Health Act 2003 also reiterates the right of access
to medical services,122 and identifies the protection, respect, promotion, and
fulfillment of the rights of persons with disabilities as one of its objectives.123
Like other legislation, this Act also acknowledges that the ability of the state to
meet these goals is constrained by available resources.124 The Act prohibits the
refusal of a health care provider, worker, or establishment to provide
emergency medical treatment.125 The Act further reinforces the obligations of
equal access to health care through its licensing requirements.126 However,
because the constitutional protections for individuals with disability are
derogable, it is unclear whether these requirements will continue within a
declared state of emergency.

116. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 § 14(1).
117. Id. § 24.
118. Id. Schedule, § 29(3)(b).
119. Id. § 29(3)(c).
120. Id. ch. 1, § 1(xxii) (defining “prohibited grounds” as “race, gender, sex. . .disability”).
121. S. Afr. Const., 1996, art. 37.
122. See National Health Act 61 of 2003 § 1 (S. Afr.).
123. Id. § 2(c)(iv).
124. Id. § 2(a)(ii). The Minister of Health is required to “within the limits of available
resources . . . equitably priorit[z]e the health services that the State can provide.” Id. § 3(1)(e).
125. Id. § 5. The requirement that services are distributed equitably is extended to
municipalities as well See National Health Act 61 of 2003 § 3(2).
126. The Act requires a “certificate of need” to:
establish, construct, modify, or acquire a health establishment or health agency; [ ]
increase the number of beds in or acquire prescribed health technology at, a health
establishment or health agency; [ ] provide prescribed health services; or [ ] continue to
operate a health establishment or health agency after the expiration of 24 months from the
date this Act took effect, without being in possession of certificate of need.
Id. § 36(1). In issuing a certificate of need, the Director-General must take into account specific
issues, which include equitable distribution and access to care. Id. § 36(3).
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2. Specific Protection Relating to Pandemics
South Africa has both a Disaster Management Act and a Policy Framework
for the Disaster Management Act. The Act establishes what constitutes a
disaster and what should apply to public health emergencies like epidemics.127
The Act itself refers to occurrences that cause disease in the definition of a
disaster,128 and the Policy Framework129 explicitly classifies biological agents
as natural hazards.130 Although no section specifically references the rights of
individuals with disabilities, the Policy Framework stresses the need to
consider individuals with special needs131 and at-risk groups throughout,
including specific instruction to place priority on “those areas, communities
and households that . . . have the least capacity to resist and recover from
resulting impacts [of the threat].”132 This would seem to place individuals with
disabilities potentially at the front of the line in receiving medical interventions
in times of scarcity.
South Africa also has a final draft of an Influenza Pandemic Preparedness
Plan (Pandemic Preparedness Plan). Although it is not clear whether this draft
has been formally promulgated, it provides insights into the country’s approach
to a pandemic.133 If a pandemic occurs, the Pandemic Preparedness Plan’s
protocol requires that, if clinical guidelines are not readily available, WHOguidelines should be adopted with respect to treating patients.134 Like Mexico,
South Africa’s plan focuses primarily on vaccination and administration of
antivirals, rather than on allocation of critical care among flu patients.135 The

127. See generally Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002 § 1 (S. Afr.).
128. Id. § 1. Disaster is defined as:
a progressive or sudden, widespread or locali[z]ed, natural or human-caused occurrence
which [ ] causes or threatens to cause [ ] death, injury or disease; [ ] damage to property,
infrastructure or the environment; or [ ] disruption of the life of the community; and [ ] is
of a magnitude that exceeds the ability of those affected by the disaster to cope with its
effects using only their own resources.
Id.
129. In the event that resource allocation would be required, one can presume for the purposes
of this paper that the magnitude of the disaster would reach the levels required above in order to
fall within the umbrella of the protections afforded under both the Disaster Management Act and
the National Disaster Management Framework.
130. General Notice 654 of 2005 § 2.1.7 (S. Afr.) (including “epidemic diseases affecting
people or livestock” as an example of a hazard).
131. Id. § 2.1.4.
132. Id. § 3.2.3.
133. S. AFR. NAT’L DEPT. HEALTH, INFLUENZA PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS PLAN, FINAL
DRAFT 6-9 (2006) [hereinafter SOUTH AFRICA’S PREPAREDNESS PLAN].
134. Id. at 13.
135. Id. at 13-14. For example, it outlines that the Outbreak Response Team should monitor
resource utilization and instructs the directorate of the Pharmaceutical Policy and Planning team
to develop a plan for stockpiling vaccines and antivirals and to “ensure the provision of medical
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Pandemic Preparedness Plan separates a pandemic threat into several phases,
outlining the objectives and activities within each phase.136 Phase Six
addresses the actual pandemic period, in which the government should
consider applying emergency powers.137 The health system has the
responsibility of “provid[ing] guidance on ways to optimi[z]e patient care with
limited resources.”138
On the whole, South Africa seemingly provides significant protections to
persons with disabilities through its ratification of the Convention and its
express constitutional protections.139 However, its constitutional provision that
allows waiver of those protections in times of emergency140 is troublesome and
creates the potential for discrimination in the distribution of resources in times
of scarcity. Although disability protection is bolstered in legislation as well,141
unlimited emergency medical treatment is unlikely to be feasible in a
pandemic, and allocation decisions must be made on some basis. The country’s
refusal to recognize disability rights as non-derogable may place people with
disabilities at the bottom of a distribution hierarchy given that other rights
remain in force during a pandemic.
D. Singapore
1. General Protection for People with Disabilities
Singapore has little protection for individuals with disabilities within its
borders. The country has signed the Convention, but, to date, has not ratified
it.142 Until this document is ratified, the Convention’s protections remain
merely symbolic for Singapore’s citizens.
Singapore’s Constitution does provide that “all persons are equal before
the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.”143 Although it broadly
prohibits “discrimination against citizens of Singapore on the ground only of
religion, race, descent or place of birth,” it does not include disability in the list
of protected traits.144 Moreover, even these protections may be abrogated in

supplies before and during outbreaks.” Id. at 18. The Department of Social Development is
responsible for ensuring “the availability of basic social needs during outbreaks.” Id. at 19.
136. SOUTH AFRICA’S PREPAREDNESS PLAN, supra note 133, at 23-36 (Annex A).
137. Id. at 36.
138. Id. at 37 (“Fully implement[ing] pandemic plans for health systems and essential
services, adjust triage, deploy workforce and provide social/psychological support.”).
139. See, e.g., S. Afr. Const., 1996, arts. 3, 9, 27 and 37.
140. Id. art. 37(5)(c).
141. See, e.g., Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000
§§ 1, 2, 14, 24, 129 (S. Afr.); National Health Act 61 of 2003 §§ 1, 2, 3, 5, 36 (S. Afr.).
142. U.N. Convention Signatures, supra note 30.
143. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE, 1963, art. 12(1) (Sing.).
144. Id. art. 12(2).
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times of crisis, as Parliament has the constitutional authority “to make laws
with respect to any matter, if it appears to Parliament that the law is required
by reason of emergency.”145 Although Singapore has legislation specifically
addressing disability discrimination with respect to the accessibility of physical
spaces,146 no legislation relates to the resource allocation issues at question
here.147
2. Specific Protection Relating to Pandemics
Singapore has adopted both a general Guide to Infectious Diseases of
Public Health Importance in Singapore148 and a more specific Influenza
Pandemic Plan.149 As in other countries, these documents address allocation of
antiretroviral treatment vaccination with respect to influenza,150 rather than the
allocation of critical care medicine. The lack of specific guidance in this area
coupled with the lack of general antidiscrimination laws relating to disability
suggest strongly that allocation decisions will be made at the bedside entirely
at the discretion of medical personnel.
As is apparent, there are very few legal protections for people with
disabilities in Singapore. Thus, there seems to be little protection against
exclusion from treatment based on disability during a public health emergency.
E.

Cambodia
1. General Protection for People with Disabilities

In 2012, Cambodia ratified the Convention.151 Because the country regards
treaties and conventions as superior to everything but its Constitution,152 the
protections offered by the treaty may ensure some fairness in the allocation of
scarce resources during a public health emergency for this population.
Cambodia’s Constitution also provides some protection from
discrimination for people with disabilities. It provides that “the State shall help

145. Id. art. 150(4).
146. See Building Control Act, (Act No. 8/ 1989) § 22D (Sing.); SING. BLDG. & CONSTR.
AUTH., CODE ON ACCESSIBILITY IN THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 8, 12, 17 (2007) [hereinafter
ACCESSIBILITY CODE].
147. These discrimination protection Acts deal with accessibility and building codes. See
Building Control Act § 22D; ACCESSIBILITY CODE, supra note 146.
148. See MINISTRY OF HEALTH, A GUIDE TO INFECTIOUS DISEASES OF PUBLIC HEALTH
IMPORTANCE IN SINGAPORE (Adrian Ong & Goh Kee Tai, eds., 7th ed. 2011) [hereinafter GUIDE
TO INFECTIOUS DISEASES].
149. See MINISTRY OF HEALTH, INFLUENZA PANDEMIC READINESS AND RESPONSE PLAN
(2005).
150. See id. 10-16; see also GUIDE TO INFECTIOUS DISEASES, supra note 148, at 54.
151. U.N. Convention Signatures, supra note 30.
152. CONST. OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA, 1993, art. 55 (Cambodia).
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support the disabled and the families of combatants who sacrificed their lives
for the nation.”153 However, the type of support is not defined, and the
inclusion of “families of combatants” suggests the provision could be limited
to those whose disabilities arose from warfare in some respect. Although it also
provides that all citizens are “equal before the law, enjoying the same rights
and freedom and obligations regardless of race, color, sex . . . or other
status”154 it does not define the meaning of “other status.”
Cambodia’s Constitution does provide that “the health of the people shall
be guaranteed.”155 It also states that the nation “shall pay attention to disease
prevention and medical treatment,”156 suggesting that access to health care, at a
minimum, is an important commitment of the government. Nevertheless,
Cambodia’s economic situation limits its ability to fulfill these
commitments.157 While the country has made significant improvements in
health status in recent years, health inequities persist among different segments
of the population, and the government plays a limited role in providing health
care.158
In contrast, the Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities specifically provides that it is intended to “protect
and promote the rights of persons with disabilities within the Kingdom of
Cambodia.”159 Coverage includes “any persons who lack, lose, or damage any
physical or mental functions, which result in a disturbance to their daily life or
activities, such as physical, visual, hearing, intellectual impairments, mental
disorders and any other types of disabilities toward the insurmountable end of
the scale.”160 As a whole, however, the law is relatively vague. Although it
states that the country “shall give due attention, as appropriate, to promoting
livelihoods for persons with disabilities in conformity with the national
economic situation,”161 it provides few specific protections against disability

153. Id. art. 74 (this is the English translation provided in the tri-lingual text 2008 version of
the Constitution).
154. Id. art. 31.
155. Id. art. 72.
156. Id. art. 72.
157. See THE WORLD BANK, TECHNICAL ANNEX ON A PROPOSED GRANT IN THE AMOUNT
OF SDR 3.8 MILLION TO THE ROYAL KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA FOR AN AVIAN AND HUMAN
INFLUENZA CONTROL AND PREPAREDNESS EMERGENCY PROJECT UNDER THE GLOBAL
PROGRAM FOR AVIAN INFLUENZA AND HUMAN PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR
ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES UNDER THE HORIZONTAL APL 2 (2008) [hereinafter WORLD BANK
CONTROL AND PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM].
158. WORLD HEALTH ORG., COUNTRY COOPERATION SURVEY AT A GLANCE: CAMBODIA 1
(2014).
159. Law on the Protection and the Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 1
(Cambodia).
160. Id. art. 4.
161. Id. art. 10.
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discrimination, particularly in the health care context.162 Nevertheless, because
the law provides that international treaties govern its application,163
Cambodia’s ratification of the Convention in 2012 should reaffirm its
commitment to the prevention of disability discrimination.164
2. Specific Protection Relating to Pandemics
Although the government of Cambodia does not provide readily accessible
information on its plans for an epidemic, it is currently working with the World
Bank and the WHO on emergency preparedness in the face of an influenza
epidemic.165 From this collaboration, several documents have developed that
delve into the details of Cambodia’s pandemic plans, although they focus more
on increasing capacity to respond to an epidemic, rather than on resource
allocation.166 Nevertheless, the Cambodian government has developed an
Avian and Human Influenza Project Code of Conduct (Code of Conduct).167
Relevant to our purposes, this document requires that all caregivers “discharge
[their] duties in accordance with the Law and relevant decrees and
regulations,”168 “respect religious freedom, promote equity . . . and not
discriminate on the basis of any other person’s race, colo[]r, religion, gender,
marital and parental status, handicap, age, or national origin.”169 Because there
are no specific directives on how the government should implement these
principles in times of a pandemic, it is impossible to predict the protection they
would provide to people with disabilities.

162. The only provisions about specific discrimination include that qualified individuals with
disabilities have a “right to be employed without discrimination.” Id. art. 33. Additionally,
“stigmatization and discrimination against [electoral] candidates with disabilities shall be
prohibited.” Id. art. 45.
163. Law on the Protection and the Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art.
49 (Cambodia).
164. See U.N. Convention Signatures, supra note 30.
165. See WORLD BANK CONTROL AND PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM, supra note 157, at 3.
Mexico coordinated with the World Bank on a similar project in November 2009 in order to
“improv[e] its National Epidemiological Surveillance System (SINAVE) including the upgrading
of the Borrower’s national reference laboratory for epidemiological surveillance, strength[en] the
infrastructure to effectively distribute medicines, vaccines and medical supplies and replenish[]
and expand[] the country’s strategic reserves thereof.” Influenza Prevention and Control, THE
WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P116965/influenza-prevention-control?lang=
en&tab=overview (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
166. WORLD BANK CONTROL AND PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM, supra note 157, at 8.
167. See ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR DISASTER
MANAGEMENT, AVIAN AND HUMAN INFLUENZA CONTROL AND PREPAREDNESS EMERGENCY
PROJECT IDA GRANT NO. H361-KH CODE OF ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR STAFF (2010) [hereinafter
CODE OF ETHICAL CONDUCT].
168. Id. at 1.
169. Id.
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Overall, while Cambodia’s laws offer limited protection for people with
disabilities, it does have some laws that offer explicit protection.170 Its
ratification of the Convention, given the strong authority it grants such
international agreements,171 may be the strongest protection in Cambodia. It
has confirmed this commitment to equitable treatment in its Code of Conduct,
which specifically applies to pandemics.172 However, Cambodia provides an
example of how practical realities may suggest these dictates are merely
aspirations. Given its inability to realize its commitment to guarantee the
health of its citizens,173 it may not be in a position to fulfill its commitment to
equal access to care for people with disabilities in the event of a public health
emergency.
F.

Australia
1. General Protection for People with Disabilities

Australia ratified the Convention174 and because the Convention did not
create new rights or entitlements, but rather, expressed existing rights found in
the country’s Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act of 1986
(Human Rights Act),175 the Convention came into force in Australia.176 The
Human Rights Act specifies the right to file a complaint with the Commission
established by the Act, as well as with the Australian courts.177

170. See, e.g., Law on the Protection and the Promotion of the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (Cambodia).
171. See id. art. 49.
172. CODE OF ETHICAL CONDUCT, supra note 167, at 1.
173. See WORLD BANK CONTROL AND PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM, supra note 157, at 2.
174. U.N. Convention Signatures, supra note 30.
175. ATTORNEY GEN. OF AUSTRALIA, EXPLANATORY STATEMENT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ACT 1986 CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES DECLARATION 2009 at 1 (2009) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL EXPLANATORY
STATEMENT].
176. Id. Although Australia typically requires implementing legislation in order for a treaty to
be binding law, it does not require that specific implementing legislation be enacted. Should the
Australian government find that prior enacted legislation is either adequate “to implement the
provisions of the convention” or that the treaty obligations “can be implemented progressively
and without radical change to existing laws,” it would not require passing new legislation
specifically to implement a convention. Treaty Making Process, AUSTL. DEP’T OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS & TRADE, http://www.dfat.gov.au/treaties/making/#constitution (last visited Feb. 28,
2015). With respect to the Convention, the Attorney General determined that the Convention was
consistent with the provisions of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act
1986. ATTORNEY GENERAL EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 175.
177. Australian Human Rights Act 1986 pt. IIB 46P(1) (Austl.).
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Australia’s Constitution refers to disability only in the context of requiring
states to treat residents of other states equally.178 Thus, antidiscrimination
provisions primarily are defined by Australian legislation.
Australia’s Disability Discrimination Act of 1992 prohibits both direct and
indirect disability discrimination,179 which is defined as treating, or proposing
to treat, a person with disabilities less favorably than others without the
disability “in circumstances that are not materially different.”180 The Act
applies to the provision of “goods and services,” employment, and access to
premises, whether public or private.181 Of potentially particular significance,
the legislation precludes discrimination in the administration of
Commonwealth laws and programs.182 Because Australia has a universal
health care system that is administered by the government,183 health care
access would fall within this mandate.184
These antidiscrimination provisions can be overcome by a showing of an
unjustifiable hardship on the person providing the services, which is
determined by reference to five factors:
(1) the nature of the benefit or detriment likely to accrue to, or to be suffered
by, any person concerned; (2) the effect of the disability of any person
concerned; (3) the financial circumstances, and the estimated amount of the
expenditure required to be made, by the first person; (4) the availability of
financial and other assistance to the first person; and (5) any relevant action
185
plans given to the Commission under section 64.

In addition, the Act requires that those subject to its provisions make
reasonable adjustments for people with disabilities that would allow them to
meet any requirements or conditions deemed necessary.186 If a failure to make

178. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION ch. 12., art. 177. The section provides: “A subject of the
Queen, resident in any state, shall not be subject in any other State to any disability or
discrimination which would be equally applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen
resident of such other state.” Id. art. 102.
179. Disability Discrimination Act 1992 art. 5 & 6 (Austl.).
180. Id. art. 5(1).
181. Id. art. 21, 23, & 24.
182. Id. art. 29.
183. Australia’s Health System, AUSTRALIAN INST. OF HEALTH & WELFARE,
http://www.aihw.gov.au/australias-health/2014/health-system/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). While
Australia does have some private health care, the majority of care, particularly the hospital-based
care relevant to this discussion, is publicly funded. See id. Table 2.1.
184. “The aim of the Australian health system is to give universal access to health care under
what is known as ‘Medicare’, while allowing choice for individuals through substantial private
sector involvement in delivery and financing.” WORLD HEALTH ORG., COUNTRY HEALTH
INFORMATION PROFILES: AUSTRALIA 16 (2011).
185. Disability Discrimination Act 1992 art.11 (Austl.).
186. Id. art. 5(2).
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such adjustments “has, or is likely to have, the effect of disadvantaging persons
with the disability,” the failure would constitute discrimination.187
2. Specific Protection Relating to Pandemics
The Australian government has compiled several documents meant to
guide decision-making in the event of a pandemic. One example is the
Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza (Health
Management Plan), which takes into consideration the lessons learned from
the H1N1 pandemic in 2009.188 Importantly, this document provides an ethical
framework to guide how decisions should be made, including the
determination of how to allocate scarce resources.189 Two major principles
include protecting the entire population and providing care in an equitable
manner.190 At the same time, the Health Management Plan affords some
flexibility by endorsing “the use of policy that can respond to the . . . resources
we have available.”191 The document expands on these resources, discussing
personnel, as well as facilities and equipment. The discussion of facilities and
equipment includes the use of personal protective equipment and vaccines to
prevent infection to health individuals, and antivirals to treat sick
individuals.192 These discussions assume scarcity may occur and allocation
may need to be managed at the national level. While there is discussion that
health care workers and other essential personnel may receive priority for
prevention measures, there is no discussion of how allocation decisions would
be made for treating sick people.193
In addition to the Health Management Plan, the Information Kit and
Workplan for General Practice, focusing specifically on pandemic influenza,
provides some insight into the allocation of scarce resources, as it concerns
hospital beds.194 The document states that as hospitals become overwhelmed,

187. Id. art. 6(1)(c).
188. DEP’T OF HEALTH & AGING, AUSTRALIAN HEALTH MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: IMPORTANT INFORMATION FOR ALL AUSTRALIANS 7 (2009) (Austl.)
[hereinafter AUSTRALIA’S MANAGEMENT PLAN]. Other documents include the Interim National
Pandemic Influenza Clinical Guidelines, which is intended primarily for health professionals to
use when dealing with avian and pandemic influenza patients, including discussion of
prioritization of both vaccines and antivirals that will be necessary at some point during the
pandemic. See AUSTL. DEP’T OF HEALTH & AGING, INTERIM NATIONAL PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
CLINICAL GUIDELINES (2009).
189. AUSTRALIA’S MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 188, at 33.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 35.
192. Id. at 38.
193. Id. Appendix F (p. 99-100).
194. See AUSTL. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., PREPARING FOR AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC: AN
INFORMATION KIT AND WORKPLAN FOR GENERAL PRACTICE 13 (2006) [hereinafter WORKPLAN
FOR GENERAL PRACTICE].
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admission should only continue for patients “who may benefit from hospital
care,”195 necessitating home care for the mildly sick and palliative care for
terminally ill patients.196 It does not explain how medical providers would
make the determination of who receives assistance under this standard.
Finally, Exercise Sustain 08: Overview (Exercise Sustain) is a report based
on a series of pandemic exercises to deal with potential policy issues identified
in the National Action Plan for Human Influenza Pandemic, which discusses
government coordination for pandemic response.197 Exercise Sustain identifies
the prioritization of vulnerable groups for care as a policy issue that needs
attention. The exercises resulted in inconsistent conclusions in this regard.
While one exercise led to the conclusion that national guidelines prioritizing
services and care for vulnerable groups should be established,198 others
concluded that national guidelines would be “too prescriptive, given that many
of the decisions relating to the prioritization of vulnerable groups would need
to be made at a local level.”199 These responses illustrate the general problem
of allocation protocols. Although most recognize that guidelines for critical
periods may provide needed protection and consistency for vulnerable
populations, there is reluctance to restrict the discretion of local (often
medical) decision-makers. As such, Exercise Sustain provides perhaps the
most realistic insight into how Australia would actually respond in a public
health emergency, despite legislation requiring equitable treatment of people
with disabilities.
In summary, Australia does not provide constitutional protection to people
with disabilities, but does provide protections through multiple pieces of
legislation200 and its ratification of the Convention. This includes provisions
precluding discrimination based on disability in government programs, which
is significant in a country in which most care—particularly hospital care—is
government-funded. These commitments are reinforced in its plan for
pandemic influenza.201 However, as noted above, documents describing
pandemic preparedness efforts202 suggest a desire for flexibility in decision-

195. Id. at 13.
196. Id.
197. COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIAN GOV’TS, HUMAN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC EXERCISE
PROGRAM: EXERCISE SUSTAIN 08 OVERVIEW 3 (2009) [hereinafter EXERCISE SUSTAIN 08]; see
also AUSTL. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR HUMAN INFLUENZA
PANDEMIC (2009).
198. EXERCISE SUSTAIN 08, supra note 197, at 30.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Australian Human Rights Act 1986 (Austl.); Disability Discrimination Act
1992, arts. 5, 6, 21, 23, 24, 29 (Austl).
201. See AUSTRALIA’S MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 188.
202. See EXERCISE SUSTAIN 08, supra note 197.
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making that if provided, could undermine the legal protections afforded to
people with disabilities.
G. New Zealand
1. General Protection for People with Disabilities
New Zealand has enacted comprehensive protection for people with
disabilities at all levels of government. In 2008, the country ratified the
Convention,203 which is binding in New Zealand.204 Likewise, the country has
passed legislation to align existing laws with the Convention’s requirements.
Although there is no constitutional protection of disability in New Zealand,
the nation has extremely robust legislative enactments in this area. In
particular, the Human Rights Act of 1993 provides extensive protections
against disability discrimination under the umbrella of a general
antidiscrimination law.205 The Act categorizes disability as a prohibited ground
for discrimination206 and gives examples of what qualifies as a disability,207
including “physical illness” and “the presence in the body of organisms
capable of causing illness.”208 As is apparent, this definition would include
individuals sickened in a pandemic.
The refusal or failure “to provide [an individual with disabilities] with . . .
goods, facilities, or services”209 on the basis of disability, or treating
individuals with disabilities less favorably with respect to their provision of
care,210 is prohibited discrimination unless the provider can show the services

203. U.N. Convention Signatures, supra note 30.
204. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Ministry of Foreign, NEW
ZEALAND TREATIES ONLINE http://www.treaties.mfat.govt.nz/search/details/t/3620 (last visited
Feb. 28, 2015). New Zealand Treaties Online is the official record of binding international law in
New Zealand. NEW ZEALAND TREATIES ONLINE http://www.treaties.mfat.govt.nz// (last visited
Feb. 28, 2015). See also The Treating Making Process in New Zealand, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS & TRADE http://mfat.govt.nz/Treaties-and-International-Law/03-Treaty-making-process/
index.php (last updated Jan. 12, 2015).
205. See New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993 (N.Z.).
206. Id. pt. 2, § 21(h).
207. See id.
208. Id. The complete list is as follows:
(i) physical disability or impairment; (ii) physical illness; (iii) psychiatric illness; (iv)
intellectual or psychological disability or impairment; (v) any other loss or abnormality or
psychological, physiological, or anatomical structure or function; (vi) reliance on a guide
dog, wheelchair, or other remedial means; (vii) the presence in the body of organisms
capable of causing illness.
Id.
209. New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993, § 44(1).
210. Id. § 44(1).
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would have to be provisioned in a “special manner.”211 If this exception is met,
the provider, where reasonable, can impose more onerous terms for individuals
with disabilities,212 or refuse to provide the services altogether.213
Nevertheless, even “conduct, practice[s], condition[s], or requirement[s]” that
appear to comply with the Act can be unlawful if they have the effect of
discriminating against individuals with disabilities in the absence of a “good
reason for it.”214
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act of 1990 also reaffirms that “everyone
has the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of
discrimination,”215 specified in the 1993 Human Rights Act.216 The Act applies
to direct actions performed by either the executive, legislative, or judicial
branch, or any person performing a “public function, power, or duty conferred
or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law.”217 The Act prohibits
the deprivation of life unless the grounds are both established by law and
“consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.”218 Nevertheless, it
allows for “limitations” on the rights and freedoms outlined in the Act, but
only those that “can be reasonably justified in a free and democratic
society.”219 Given the 1993 Human Rights Act and the 2000 Public Health and
Disability Act220 described below, it does not appear that disability
discrimination could be “reasonably justified.” This conclusion is further
supported by the New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan: A Framework for
Action (Framework for Action), which lists the New Zealand statutes that

211. Id. § 52(a) (“the person who supplies the facilities or services cannot reasonably be
expected to provide them in that special manner.”) The statute does not define nor give examples
of what is meant by a “special manner.”
212. Id. § 52(b).
213. Id.
214. New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993, § 65.
Where any conduct, practice, requirement, or condition that is not apparently in
contravention of any provision of this Part has the effect of treating a person or group of
persons differently on 1 of the prohibited grounds of discrimination in a situation where
such treatment would be unlawful under any provision of this Part other than this section,
that conduct, practice, condition, or requirement shall be unlawful under that provision
unless the person whose conduct or practice is in issue, or who imposes the condition or
requirement, establishes good reason for it.
Id.
215. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, pt. 2, § 19(1).
216. See New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993 pts. 1A, 2.
217. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, pt. 1, § 3.
218. Id. pt. 2, § 8.
219. Id. pt. 1, § 5.
220. See generally New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2015]

THE IMPACT OF DISABILITY

287

cannot be modified during a public health emergency.221 These include the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.222
Notably for our purposes, New Zealand’s Public Health and Disability Act
of 2000 identifies the elimination of health disparities among vulnerable
populations as a national goal.223 The Act establishes District Health Boards,
charged with “developing and implementing, in consultation with the groups
concerned, services and program[]s designed to raise their health outcomes to
those of other New Zealanders.”224 It is not clear how or if these provisions
would apply in an epidemic.
2. Specific Protection Relating to Pandemics
The government of New Zealand has outlined the nation’s strategy for
handling an influenza pandemic in several thoughtful documents. This includes
both epidemic legislation and guidance documents developed by relevant
Agencies.
New Zealand’s Epidemic Preparedness Act of 2006 was promulgated “to
enable the relaxation of some statutory requirements that might not be capable
of being complied with, or complied with fully, during an epidemic.”225 This
broad power, however, does have some limitations. The Act does not authorize
modification of:
[1] a requirement [] to release a person from custody or detention; or [] to have
any person’s detention reviewed . . . or [2] . . . a restriction on keeping a person
in custody or detention; or [3] . . . a requirement or restriction imposed by the
Bill of Rights 1688, the Constitution Act 1986, the Electoral Act 1993, the
Judicature Amendment Act 1972, or the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
226
. . . or by [the Epidemic Preparedness] Act.

This suggests some protections of people with disabilities could fall victim to
exigencies of an epidemic. The Director-General of Health is authorized to
make decisions about prioritization of disbursement of medicine during an
epidemic, and “every person administering, dispensing, prescribing, or
supplying medicines that are under the control of the Crown or a Crown entity”
must conform to these provisions.227 The legislation gives no indication,
however, of the method through which prioritization decisions should occur.
221. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, NEW ZEALAND INFLUENZA PANDEMIC PLAN: A FRAMEWORK
121 (2010) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION].
222. Id. Other statutes that cannot be modified include the Bill of Rights 1688, Constitution
Act 1986, Electoral Act 1993, Judicature Amendment Act 1972, and the Epidemic Preparedness
Act 2006. Id.
223. New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, pt. 1, § 3(1)(b).
224. Id. pt. 3, § 22(1)(f).
225. Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006, § 3(2)(b) (N.Z.).
226. Id. § 12(3).
227. Health Amendment Act 2006, § 74(C)(2) (N.Z.).

FOR ACTION

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

288

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 8:259

The 2008 National Health Emergency Plan (Emergency Plan) provides
broad guidance with respect to health emergencies, including infectious
disease pandemics.228 According to the document, the plan provides
“overarching direction to the health and disability sector and all of
government,”229 and would become active when “usual resources are
overwhelmed or have the potential to be overwhelmed.”230 It outlines various
legislative documents as part of the plan,231 which suggests that it would work
in conjunction with said legislation. Although its main focus is on the specific
needs of indigenous populations, the Emergency Plan requires the government
to maintain an effective dialogue with other vulnerable communities,
especially those at risk in a pandemic.232 It sets forth principles for managing
health emergencies, which include providing:
an emergency management structure that supports, to the greatest extent
possible, the protection of all . . . health and disability service consumers . . .
[and] support for services that are best able to meet the needs of
patients/clients and their communities during and after an emergency event,
even when resources are limited, and ensure that special provisions are made
for hard-to-reach, vulnerable communities so that emergency responses do not
233
create or exacerbate inequalities.

This specific language would seem to provide individuals with disabilities,
tangible protection when seeking access to resources in public health
emergencies.234

228. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, NATIONAL HEALTH EMERGENCY PLAN 6 (2008) [hereinafter
EMERGENCY PLAN].
229. Id. at IV.
Specifically the NHEP: outlines the structure of emergency management in New Zealand
and how the health and disability sector fits within it, and provides a high-level
description of responsibilities held by local and regional groupings compared to those
held at the national level by the Ministry; provides the health and disability sector with
guidance and strategic direction on its approach to planning for and responding to health
emergencies in New Zealand; provides other organi[z]ations and government agencies
with contextual information on emergency management in the health sector and the
structure the health and disability sector uses in response to an emergency.
Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. EMERGENCY PLAN, supra note 228, at 18.
233. Id.
234. Further guidance is provided in the National Reserve Supplies Management Usage
Policies, which discusses management and use of national reserve supplies, along with any
guiding principles that should be utilized in determining allocation. However, this document is
more relevant to antiretroviral and vaccine allocation, rather than allocation of critical care. See
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, NATIONAL HEALTH EMERGENCY PLAN: NATIONAL RESERVE SUPPLIES
MGMT. & USAGE POLICIES 1, 7 (3rd ed. 2013).
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The 2010 Framework for Action restates the central government’s role in
planning and responding to an influenza pandemic,235 and “sets out all-ofgovernment measures to be taken to prepare for and respond to an influenza
pandemic.”236 The Framework for Action does not specifically address the
allocation of critical care during a pandemic, but reaffirms the government’s
intent to “minimi[z]e the impact of the disease, and to mitigate its effects on
the people of New Zealand without increasing health inequalities.”237 It
specifically provides that individuals requiring assistance, including
individuals with chronic disability, should be “as a matter of priority . . .
targeted to provide support.”238
Of particular significance, New Zealand devised an ethical framework, the
2007 Getting Through Together: Ethical Values for a Pandemic (Getting
Through Together), to “help health professionals [] make the best and fairest
use of resources in situations of overwhelming demand,”239 when planning for
or responding to an epidemic.240 The framework identifies the values that
should inform how decisions are made, such as inclusiveness, reasonableness,
and responsibleness. Inclusiveness is defined as including people from all
cultures and communities who will be affected by the decision.241
235. FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, supra note 221, at 10-11. This document includes a nice
summary of applicable legislation, including those provisions that cannot be modified even under
emergency powers. Id. at 117-125.
236. Id. at 1. According to the plan, the Ministry of Health, which promulgated the document,
is responsible for leading the government’s response to any pandemic. This means that any
Agencies’ actions would be based on the direction from the Ministry of Health. Id. at iii. Notably,
these measures are largely directed towards central government planning. It is not meant to
prescribe local plans. Id. at 1.
237. FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, supra note 221, at 9, Figure 1. According to the plan, the
health sector operates, among other strategies, under the New Zealand Disability Strategy. Id. at
14. The Disability Strategy’s objectives include ensuring the rights for disabled people.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, THE NEW ZEALAND DISABILITY STRATEGY, 15 (2001). It also encourages
government actions that ensure that all government Agencies treat disabled people with dignity
and respect. Id. at 20. Finally, through its objective of creating long-term support systems
centered on the individual, it promotes the action of ensuring that overarching processes,
eligibility criteria and allocation of resources are nationally consistent, but that individual needs
are treated flexibly. Id. at 21. This objective also encourages “equity funding and service
provision for people with similar needs, regardless of the cause of their impairment. Id.
238. FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, supra note 221, at 20.
239. NAT’L ETHICS ADVISORY COMM., GETTING THROUGH TOGETHER: ETHICAL VALUES
FOR A PANDEMIC at iv (2007) [hereinafter GETTING THROUGH TOGETHER]. Getting Through
Together was compiled by the National Ethics Advisory Committee (NEAC). The NEAC is an
independent advisor to the Ministry of Health. Id. It “works within the context of the New
Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 and the key strategy statements for the health
sector.” Id. The plan provided is meant to offer guidance for healthcare providers during a
pandemic. Id.
240. Id. at 22.
241. GETTING THROUGH TOGETHER, supra note 239, at 24.
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Reasonableness means “using a fair process to make decisions,”242 and
responsibleness is “acting on our responsibility to others for our decisions and
actions.”243 The document makes clear that “those involved in pandemicplanning should understand, respect and make due allowance for the diversity
of affected populations.”244
Getting Through Together also emphasizes the importance of minimizing
harm, as well as the importance of respect and fairness in allocating resources
in pandemics.245 Minimizing harm means both “protecting one another from
harm”246 and “not harming others.”247 The framework encourages
consideration of a pandemic’s potentially exacerbated impact on vulnerable
communities.248 Respect is defined as the recognition that “every person
matters and treating people accordingly,”249 which encompasses protecting
people with impaired or diminished autonomy and vulnerable populations that
may be incapable of protecting their own interests.250 Finally, fairness means
“ensuring that everyone gets a fair go,” “prioritizing fairly when there are not
enough resources for all to get the services they need,” and “minimizing
inequalities.”251 Efforts should be taken to ensure prioritization does not further
disadvantage already disadvantaged populations that already face health
inequalities.252
The framework of Getting Through Together also provides an example of
how to make allocation and prioritization decisions in an epidemic, by
identifying a series of questions to be used to determine whether a patient does
or does not receive intensive care unit (ICU) treatment.253 These questions
provide direct insight into how New Zealand would allocate its resources in an
epidemic. Question six, the most pertinent to our inquiry, asks, “can this
patient be ranked highly enough based on benefit from ICU treatment?”254 Net
benefit is determined by “considering the benefit of ICU treatment, the harm of
missing out, and the potential to mitigate the harm should the patient miss

242. Id. at 26.
243. Id. at 27.
244. Id. at 25.
245. Id. at 28.
246. GETTING THROUGH TOGETHER, supra note 239, at 28.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 36.
249. Id. at 5.
250. Id.at 30.
251. GETTING THROUGH TOGETHER, supra note 239, at 37.
252. Id. at 38.
253. In this example, a patient has severe breathing problems for which access to ventilation
might help. Unfortunately, other patients need access to the same care and there are not enough
ICU beds. Id. at 7-22.
254. Id. at 22.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2015]

THE IMPACT OF DISABILITY

291

out[.]”255 Taking everything into consideration, the document advocates that
those with a higher net benefit score “should access the resource before those
whose ‘net benefit’ ranks lower.”256 At the same time, the document makes
clear that gender, ethnicity, and disability are not acceptable criteria for
prioritization.257
Getting Through Together exemplifies the robustness of New Zealand’s
pandemic strategy and is consistent with the country’s more general statements
about the allocation of scarce resources in pandemics and its antidiscrimination
statutes.258 Nevertheless, the focus on medical benefit can be problematic. As
discussed elsewhere,259 if the determination of medical benefit is based on
objective medical information, this document may provide significant
protection for people with disabilities in pandemics. If, however, the
assessment of “benefit” focuses on more subjective issues of quality of life, or
the fact that an individual with disabilities remains disabled after the
intervention in question, people with disabilities may be disadvantaged in
allocation decisions despite the nondiscrimination principles articulated
throughout New Zealand’s laws and policies for preparedness planning.260
H. United Kingdom
1. General Protection for People with Disabilities
The U.K. has ratified and implemented the Convention.261 The country has
indicated that the Convention is meant to set obligations “to promote, protect,
255. Id. at 20.
256. GETTING THROUGH TOGETHER, supra note 239, at 20.
257. Id. at 21.
258. See, e.g., New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993, pt. 2, §§ 21, 44, 52, 65; see also New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, pt. 1, §§ 5, 19, pt. 2, § 8; see also New Zealand Public Health
and Disability Act 2000.
259. See Playing God, supra note 10, at 763-67.
260. Id. at 766. For example, New Zealand’s Code of Health and Disability Consumers
Rights firmly establishes that “every consumer has the right to be free from discrimination,
coercion, harassment, and sexual, financial, or other exploitation.” HEALTH & DISABILITY
COMM.: CODE OF HEALTH AND DISABILITY SERVS. CONSUMERS’ RIGHTS REGULATION 1996
(2009). In addition, The Medical Council of New Zealand, a professional organization rather than
a government Agency, issued its Statement on safe practice in an environment of resource
limitation which emphasizes that, in establishing prioritization systems, doctors should be “fair,
systematic, consistent, evidence-based and transparent.” MEDICAL COUNCIL OF N.Z.,
STATEMENT ON SAFE PRACTICE IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF RESOURCE LIMITATION § 18 (2008).
261. U.N. Convention Signatures, supra note 30. The Kingdom’s Order 2009, No. 1181
establishes that the Convention is a community treaty under the Communities Act 1972, which
means that the treaty does not require additional implementing legislation. The European
Communities (Definition of Treaties) (United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities) Order 2009, §1(2) (2009) (U.K.) [hereinafter Definition of Treaties]. As such, the
U.K. establishes:
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and ensure the human rights of disabled people, so that they are treated on an
equal basis with other people.”262
The U.K also has comprehensive legislative protection for people with
disabilities. The 2010 Equality Act263 covers individuals who currently have a
disability and those who have had a disability.264 It prohibits both direct,
purposeful discrimination and indirect discrimination, while permitting the
favorable treatment of people with disabilities.265 The Act applies to public
entities, with the exception of Parliament,266 and those “concerned with the
provision of services to the public or a section of the public (for payment or
not).”267 Covered entities are required to make reasonable adjustments, which
include reasonable steps to eliminate provisions, criteria, or policies or
physical features that put persons with disabilities at substantial disadvantage
compared to those without disabilities, or to provide auxiliary aids that,
without which, would create a substantial disadvantage compared to those
without disabilities.268
The Civil Contingencies Act recognizes the need for flexibility in times of
emergency, which includes events that threaten “human welfare” and provides
that “the person making the regulations” in such circumstances has the
authority to “make any provision which is . . . appropriate for the purpose of
protecting human life, health or safety.”269 While the Act includes the
limitation that such regulations may not amend the Human Rights Act of
1998,270 which implements the European Convention on Human Rights

all such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or
arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to time
provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without
further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be
recognized and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly.
European Communities Act, (1972), §2(1) (U.K.).
262. Definition of Treaties, supra note 261, at Explanatory Note.
263. Equality Act, (2010), ch. 15 (U.K.). The United Kingdom’s Disability Discrimination
Act of 2005 was superseded largely by the Equality Act. The remaining sections simply require
that public authorities carry out functions that “have due regard” to various needs, including the
need to eliminate unlawful discrimination. Id. at Part 11, ch. 1, § 149(1); see also Disability
Discrimination Act, (2005) ch. 13, pt. 5(A), § 49 (U.K.). This Act also has regulations associated
with it; however, the most recent version available is 2010. Because only the original version is
available, it is unclear whether the regulations provided online are the most current. There is no
record of an update online. In any event, these regulations deal with topics that are irrelevant to
resource allocation.
264. Equality Act, (2010), pt. 2, ch. 1, § 4 (U.K.).
265. Id. ch. 2, §§ 13, 19.
266. Id. at Schedule 3.
267. Id. pt. 3, § 29(1).
268. Id. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 20.
269. Civil Contingencies Act, (2004), pt. 1, §§ 1(a), 5, 22(a) (U.K.).
270. Id. § 20(5)(iv).
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(European Convention),271 this restriction is not relevant to our inquiry.
Although the European Convention prohibits discrimination, it does not list
disability among its protected interests.272 Moreover, the European Convention
allows changes under public emergency situations.273
2. Specific Protection Relating to Pandemics
The U.K. government has issued several documents dealing with pandemic
preparedness. The 2012 Health and Social Care Influenza Pandemic
Preparedness and Response Plan (Preparedness Plan) identifies ethical
principles to be utilized when responding to an epidemic, to minimize its
harm,274 and requires consideration of how to provide continuous services to
vulnerable groups.275 It should be read in conjunction with the U.K.’s
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Strategy 2011 (Preparedness Strategy)276
and offers guidance on operational aspects of pandemic response in the health
and social care sectors.277 Because this document merely offers guidance, its
enforceability is unclear. Although it primarily references the provision of
treatment or vaccination,278 the Preparedness Plan does encourage the use of
pandemic-specific clinical assessment tools for making decisions about who to
convey to emergency departments—“only patients with severe illness and a
probability of responding to treatment”279—and for providing interim care for
patients who are “less-likely to benefit from critical care, or who have received
critical care but now require a lower level of care.”280 Unfortunately, the Plan
offers little additional detail on how these decisions should be made.

271. Human Rights Act, (1998), ch. 42, § 3(1) (U.K.).
272. See EUROPEAN COURT. OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS art. 12 (2015), available at http://human-rights-convention.org/thetexts/evolution-of-theconvention/?lang=en. The European Convention on Human Rights, Article 14 provides: “The
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colo[]r, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other
status.” Id. art. 14.
273. Id. (“Derogation in time of emergency”).
274. UK DEP’T OF HEALTH, NAT’L HEALTH SYS., HEALTH & SOCIAL CARE INFLUENZA
PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE 17 (2012), [hereinafter U.K.’S PREPAREDNESS PLAN].
275. Id. at 20.
276. Id. at 6; see also UK DEP’T OF HEALTH, SOC. SERV., & PUB. SAFETY, DEP’T OF
HEALTH, UK INFLUENZA PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY 2011 (2011) [hereinafter U.K.’S
PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY].
277. U.K.’S PREPAREDNESS PLAN, supra note 274, at 6.
278. Id. at 8.
279. Id. at 32.
280. Id. at 43.
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The U.K. formulated the Preparedness Strategy in response to the 2009
influenza epidemic.281 The document outlines the government’s strategic plan
for addressing an influenza pandemic.282 Like the Preparedness Plan, it merely
offers guidance to the public and private sector.283 The Preparedness Strategy
is meant to account for varying levels of pandemics that require varying levels
of resources.284 It indicates that any pandemic preparedness and response will
be “based on ethical principles”285 and endorses a framework, Responding to
Pandemic Influenza: The Ethical Framework for Policy and Planning (Ethical
Framework), developed by the Department of Health.286 The Ethical
Framework maintains several principles including respect, minimizing harm,
fairness, working together, reciprocity, keeping things in proportion,
flexibility, and good decision-making.287 However, the Ethical Framework has
been archived by the U.K., so while the principles may be valid, the document
itself is no longer recognized by the U.K. as a tool meant to guide decisionmaking during a pandemic.
Once again, however, neither the Preparedness Plan, nor the Preparedness
Strategy, discuss in detail how any allocation decisions might be made,
including prioritization for critical care.288 More specific suggestions on
allocation decisions are provided in the 2013 Preparing for Pandemic
Influenza: Guidance for Local Planners (Guidance), which was published in

281. U.K.’S PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY, supra note 276, at 2. The Influenza Strategy
explicitly supersedes the 2007 national ethical framework for responding to an influenza
pandemic (and the Scottish equivalent), although it indicates that there are not substantial changes
in approach. Id at 7. See also UK DEP’T OF HEALTH, RESPONDING TO PANDEMIC INFLUENZA:
THE ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY & PLANNING 2 (2007), [hereinafter FRAMEWORK FOR
RESPONDING].
282. U.K.’S PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY, supra note 276, at 2.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 8.
285. Id. at 20.
During a pandemic, the Government will need to make final decisions and issue advice on
the application of specific measures in the light of emerging scientific evidence and data.
In doing so, the ethical framework and in particular the principles of precaution (which
assists in ensuring that harm is minimized), proportionality and flexibility will apply
throughout.
Id. at 34.
286. This ethical framework comes from a previously archived influenza pandemic protocol
compiled by the UK Department of Health. See FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONDING, supra note 281.
287. Id. at 6-9.
288. The Strategy does reference provision of antivirals to only members of “risk groups” if
“the pandemic proves to be mild in nature or if the antiviral medicine supplies are being depleted
too rapidly.” U.K.’S PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY, supra note 276, at 14. Further, in more severe
influenza pandemics, the Strategy does recognize that non-urgent activity might need to be
reduced or ceased entirely. Id. at 52.
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conjunction with the Preparedness Strategy.289 In an annex, the Guidance
defines vulnerable people as “those that are less able to help themselves in the
circumstances of an emergency.”290 The document recommends that local
pandemic plans “include an estimate of the number of and type of potentially
vulnerable people for a locality and their needs during a pandemic”291 and “set
out the how the needs of these vulnerable groups will be met and how any
potential barriers (e.g., culture and transport) will be addressed.”292
Also in response to the 2009 pandemic, the U.K. asked the Department of
Health’s Critical Care Clinical Group to analyze future surge capacity planning
based on their very real concern that triage decisions in future pandemics
would be “left in some cases to individual clinicians, on duty at the time, to
bear the responsibility for stopping activity.”293 The Group encouraged the
National Health Service to “further develop their local approaches to triage”294
and offer a set of principles to support triage.295
The Group’s report recognizes the problematic lack of consensus among
clinicians on the effectiveness of various scoring systems, such as the
Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA).296 The report “emphasi[z]e[s]
the need for multi-specialty team decision-making arrangements to be set up
and that . . . a local decision-making process . . . [be] clearly documented,”297
but acknowledges that the decision to admit an individual to critical care is
ultimately a clinical determination based on the likelihood of benefit.298 As
indicated previously, leaving decisions about benefit in clinicians’ hands,
without other guidance, is problematic and may result in people with
disabilities being disadvantaged in critical care allocation decisions.

289. Similar to many other documents provided throughout this section, this document is
meant to serve as guidance for local Agencies in the event of an influenza pandemic. U.K.
CABINET OFFICE, PREPARING FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: GUIDANCE FOR LOCAL PLANNERS 5
(2013).
290. Id. at 27. Those individuals include children, older people, mobility impaired,
mental/cognitive function repaired, sensory impaired, individuals supported within the
community, immune-compromised children and adults, those with underlying health conditions,
individuals cared for by relatives, homeless, pregnant women, and those in need of bereavement
support. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. U.K. DEP’T OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE SWINE FLU CRITICAL CARE CLINICAL GROUP
& KEY LEARNING POINTS FOR FUTURE SURGE PLANNING 15 (2010) [hereinafter FUTURE SURGE
PLANNING].
294. Id. at 11.
295. Id. at 28-31.
296. Id. at 18.
297. Id.
298. FUTURE SURGE PLANNING, supra note 293, at 30.
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The problem of relying on clinician decision-making is further highlighted
by a document produced in 2009, The Pandemic Flu: Managing Demand and
Capacity in Healthcare Organizations (Managing Demand and Capacity).299
Although this document has been replaced by newer plans,300 it nevertheless
provides insight into the U.K.’s current policies. More to the point, it presents
specific recommendations for the allocation of critical care.
Managing Demand and Capacity expresses a commitment to ensuring that
“the needs of any patient or client populations, which may be
disproportionately affected during a pandemic, [] [are] specifically
considered.”301 With respect to a critical care setting, it recommends SOFA for
decision-making.302 Despite reference to ethical principles that include
concepts of equity and equal access to care,303 the guidance strongly suggests
that most decision-making will rest on doctors’ discretionary power. For
example, it recommends, “critical care [be] preferentially provided for
individuals who are most likely to benefit, so as to minimize the number of
avoidable deaths.”304 Managing Demand and Capacity also identifies a variety
of “exclusion criteria,” including “severe and irreversible neurological event or
condition” and “known, advanced and irreversible immunocompromise,”
among others.305 Taken together, these provisions suggest that the
identification of who is most likely to “benefit” may be based on subjective
assumptions about quality of life, unrelated to pandemic treatment, rather than
specific medical criteria. The guidance also relies on prioritization literature
from the U.S. and Canada306 that has been identified as having problematic
features for people with disabilities.307

299. U.K. DEP’T OF HEALTH, PANDEMIC FLU: MANAGING DEMAND & CAPACITY IN
HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS (SURGE) 2, 12 (2009), [hereinafter MANAGING DEMAND &
CAPACITY].
300. The Managing Demand Capacity document emphasized the need for consistent planning
in accordance with the U.K.’s national Framework for Responding. Id. at 5. However, the
Framework for Responding was superseded by the U.K. Pandemic Preparedness Strategy. See
supra note 283 and accompanying text. See also U.K.’S PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY, supra note
276.
301. MANAGING DEMAND & CAPACITY, supra note 299, at 37.
302. Id. at 54.
303. Ethical principles are listed as:
(1) Everyone matters; (2) Everyone matters equally—but this does not mean that
everyone is treated the same; (3) The interests of each person are the concern of all of us,
and of society; and (4) The harm that might be suffered by every person matters, and so
minimizing the harm that a pandemic might cause is a central concern.
Id. at 51.
304. Id. at 53.
305. Id. at 108.
306. MANAGING DEMAND & CAPACITY, supra note 299, at 53.
307. See Playing God, supra note 10.
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On the whole, the U.K. provides protection for people with disabilities
through its ratification of the Convention and through its legislation.308
However, the Civil Contingencies Act permits alteration of legal requirements
as needed during an emergency.309 Moreover, although the U.K. has engaged
in preparedness planning and proposed frameworks for decision-making
during a pandemic,310 these documents ultimately conclude that such decisions
are clinical. Thus, its legislative commitments to equality of treatment of
persons with disabilities seem at risk both from legislative enactments and
from practices in the exigencies of a pandemic.
V. CONCLUSION
We undertook this comparative investigation, in part, to determine whether
different countries’ cultures and commitments would result in different
responses to allocation of scarce resources during public health emergencies.
The U.S. is often criticized for overemphasizing respect for individual
autonomy, a moral commitment that is reflected in our Constitution and other
laws. Accordingly, we wondered, for example, whether countries like the U.K.,
with strong communitarian commitments, would adopt different laws that
would result in different approaches to developing allocation protocols.
Overall, we found an impressive commitment internationally to the rights
of people with disabilities. All of the countries we studied, with the exception
of Singapore, had ratified the Convention and recognized its provisions, in
some way, in their own laws. Mexico and South Africa have constitutional
provisions explicitly prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities,
and Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa guarantee health in their constitutions.
All of the countries except Cambodia and Singapore have legislation affording
protection to people with disabilities. This adoption of laws at a variety of
levels—treaties, constitutions, and legislations—represents an important step
forward in advancing the civil rights of people with disabilities over the last
thirty years. Given the politics of the U.S. and the challenges of amending the
Constitution, it seems unlikely that we will follow these countries’ approaches
and thus, must rely on the statutory protections contained in the Americans
With Disabilities Act (ADA). Other laws suggest a federal commitment to the

308. See, e.g., Equality Act, (2010) ch. 15 (U.K.); Disability Discrimination Act, (2005) ch.
13, pt. 5(A), § 49 (U.K.); Human Rights Act, (1998) ch. 42, § 3(1) (U.K.).
309. Civil Contingencies Act, (2004) pt. 1, §§ 15-16 (U.K.).
310. See, e.g., U.K’S PREPAREDNESS PLAN, supra note 274; see also U.K’S PREPAREDNESS
STRATEGY, supra note 276; see also FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONDING, supra note 281; see also
FUTURE SURGE PLANNING, supra note 293; see also MANAGING DEMAND & CAPACITY, supra
note 299.
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antidiscrimination principles contained in the ADA, although a more explicit
statement would be beneficial.311
However, as we previously found in the U.S., while legal protections are
crucial, they are unlikely to be sufficient to protect the civil rights of people
with disabilities during a public health emergency. While a few of the
countries affirm that the antidiscrimination statutes remain in effect during a
public health emergency, several permit those protections to be suspended
during an emergency. Moreover, behavior does not always match legal
statements. As described above, Cambodia has committed to guaranteeing
health to its citizens through its laws, but does not have the resources to do so.
Similarly, South Africa’s Constitution guarantees access to health care, but
simultaneously recognizes that resource constraints may impact its provision.
Like Cambodia, there are health disparities among its various populations.
The example of New Zealand is particularly instructive here. Although it
does not have a constitution, it has adopted the provisions of the Convention,
has its own antidiscrimination laws, and has engaged in substantial public
discussion about emergency preparedness. It has a more communitarian ethos,
reflected in the title of one of its preparedness documents, Getting Through
Together. It explicitly endorses inclusiveness and fairness as core values, and
discusses people with disabilities, along with other vulnerable populations in
its considerations. However, despite these moral commitments, it ends up
relying on medical decision-making and interpretation of net benefit as an
allocating principle, without limiting it to avoid inappropriate quality of life
determinations.
As recent events in the U.S. reflect, even when the government is
committed to enforcing its laws, individual decisions could result in violations.
The 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa provided numerous examples of the
limits of U.S. antidiscrimination laws in times of crises. Although the ADA
and the decisions of two Supreme Court cases make clear that the ADA’s
protections apply to those who have or are suspected of having infectious
disease,312 state and local governments isolated health care workers without
court orders, businesses told employees not to report to work, and children
whose parents had been in West Africa were excluded from school.313 Public
fears dominated responses without regard to the legal protections in place. In
most of these cases, those discriminated against had time to pursue legal
remedies—they typically were not infected, just regarded as at risk of

311. See Playing God, supra note 10, at 741-46.
312. School Board of Nassau County v. Airline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987); Bragdon v. Abbot,
524 U.S. 622, 639 (1998).
313. Wendy F. Hensel, Civil Rights Have a Place in Conversation, ATLANTA JOURNALCONST., Nov. 21, 2014, at 16A.
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infection.314 But when the question is about whether one receives critical care
or not, the victim of the violation may not have an opportunity to seek
enforcement of the law.
Thus, it appears that while legal protections are important, they cannot be
considered the final step. Education and public engagement is essential to
move the moral commitments reflected in antidiscrimination laws into reality.
Again, the New Zealand example is instructive. The number of preparedness
documents reflects active engagement on the issue and an effort to consider the
effect of these policies on vulnerable populations, including its indigenous
peoples. Nevertheless, there are questions about who participates in the
development of such documents. It is not clear that people with disabilities
have had a significant role in discussions of these plans; indeed, our experience
suggests that even typically active disability advocacy groups are largely
unfamiliar with the allocation protocols and preparedness plans. This may
explain the default to medical decision-making and the potentially problematic
reliance on quality of life assessments. Greater inclusion of diverse
populations, specifically including people with disabilities, would go a long
way toward fairer policies.

314. See id.
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